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The Geographical Spread of State Executions during the Irish Civil War, 1922-
1923.* 
Front and centre in   most accounts of the Irish civil war are the executions of four    
leaders of the Irish Republican Army (IRA)  in Mountjoy jail Dublin on December 8, 
1922. The men were   executed in retaliation for the killing the previous day of a 
member of parliament, Seán Hales  (T.D.). This was a reprisal execution: the four 
had been imprisoned since the start of the civil war and could not have assisted in 
the assassination. Their execution was also fratricidal.  The night before, one of the 
men, Liam Mellows, expressed his hope that ‘brothers in blood will before long be 
brothers once more in arms against the oppressor of this country-imperialist 
England’ (O’ Dwyer 2006: 68).  Three of Seán Hales brothers’ in Cork had taken the 
anti-treaty side in the civil war and pro-Treaty Hales was a personal friend of Richard 
Barrett, one of the four executed for his assassination.  
Yet the  December 8  executions did not set the template, in terms of strategic logic, 
timing, and location for the executions to follow. The four were leaders. In Mann’s 
(2005: 340, 346, 320) study of revolutionary movements, because of leadership 
changes, ideological splits, or factionalised conflict fratricide also begins in elite 
division and violence turns inwards as former comrades kill each other. Yet the 
executions after December 8 differ from Mann’s (ibid: 337) model, where state 
violence primarily involves the purging of elite cadres and the suppression of internal 
dissent. Only five of the 81 executed men in Ireland were national  leaders. A clear 
majority were of ‘other ranks’. The most common rank was private.  Given that there 
* I would like to thank Catriona Dowd, Gavin Foster, Niall O’ Dochartaigh, Richard McMahon 
and Jill Stuart for their comments on an earlier version of this article. I also thank Mina 
Moshkeri for the production of the map. 
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 was no shortage of troublesome mid-ranking and senior officers available for 
execution the pattern is striking (Keane 2018). 
This pattern was bound up with the geography of the civil war. The  December 8 
executions took place in Dublin.  While previous executions of IRA men by the British 
army had also largely taken place in the capital, few of the executions that took place 
in 1923 were carried out in Dublin or in the province of Leinster. As the war adapted 
to local circumstances their logic changed. Historians of the American civil war have 
focussed how conflict impacts people on the ground: on conflicts of loyalty in 
borderland areas, on families that become divided, on individuals being forced to 
take sides (Fellman 1989; Murrell 2005; Shaffer 2003). These are studies of 
diffusion. This article traces the origins of the execution policy to elite politics.  Yet 
my aim is to explain their diffusion and, in terms of the methods used to win the war, 
how it escalated as it spread geographically. After introducing the conflict I map the 
spread of the executions. Then I locate the origins of the policy in elite politics. 
Arguably however, guerrilla war explains more about their diffusion after   December. 
8. And since commanders on the ground  gained more say in 1923, I consider what 
the changing relationship between Dublin and these local actors explains about the 
diffusion of the executions.  
The civil war. 
The Anglo-Irish Treaty signed on  December 6, 1921 created the Irish Free State, 
constitutionally a British dominion, but possessing considerable legislative powers. 
The Northern Ireland parliament was given the choice of opting out of the new state: 
it did so on  December 7, 1922. To pro-treaty nationalists the Treaty brought an end 
to the Act of Union between Britain and Ireland (1800-1921), and would provide a 
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basis for evolution. Anti- treaty republicans saw in the treaty the disestablishment of 
the 32-county Irish Republic proclaimed during the Easter Rising of 1916 and 
accused those who signed it of betrayal.  
The Treaty was narrowly approved by the Irish parliament, Dáil Éireann, on 
January 7, 1922. The independence movement had split behind two dominant 
leaders, pro-treaty Michael Collins, and  Éamon de Valera, President of the  
Republic proclaimed in 1916.  Yet the public was  in favour of  peace.   The     
occupation by the anti-Treaty IRA  of a number of buildings, including the Four 
Courts, in Dublin on  March 12, 1922  posed a clear challenge to the 
Provisional Government and to the principle of majority rule. After an election 
on  June 16  - and an ultimatum from the British Government – the government 
attacked the Four Courts on June 28. What  ensued     was    a war between 
pro-treaty and anti- Treaty republicans   for    de  facto  control   over  the    new   
state. Yet it  was  also  a war about national legitimacy, about    which side 
could   define     themselves as most democratic and as most Irish.  
Map 1    shows  the   border between Northern Ireland  and  the Free State. Since 
partition in 1920  Northern  Ireland’s   security  forces  had    been    suppressing the 
IRA,  so the focus  of the  IRA was southerly.  After  their  defeat in Dublin  in    early 
July the IRA  retreated   south, where it   tried to defend   fixed positions behind the 
line on Figure 1  running from Limerick in  the  west to Waterford in the southeast. 
Yet  map 1    also shows  that  between  July 24 and  August  8 government troops 
landed  in  Clew Bay in county Mayo, Fenit and Tarbert in Kerry, and Youghal and 
Passage West in Cork. These    naval landings established  entry-points behind the 
Limerick-Waterford line and would separate IRA brigades in the southwest, west and 
4 
 
northwest. The line collapsed. On August 19 IRA Chief of Staff, Liam Lynch, told his 






The  war had  become   more diffuse  in two  ways: first in traveling  to a new    
location after the surrender of the Four Courts,  and second in terms of expanding in 
scope with the collapse of the Limerick-Waterford line (Schulte   and Weidman 
(2011: 144, 152). As in  conventional   civil  wars, the conflict first became more 
diffuse by being relocated. With the guerrilla war, it did so  by escalating. As  the  
IRA retreated to its most  familiar environs, this  led to attacks behind their lines and 
more localised executions. IRA Commander,  Tom Maguire  later reflected that ‘I 
was concerned very much by what you termed fragmentation, by the effort to travel 
around, make contact, and hold our groups together’ (O’ Gadhra 1999: 139).  All  the 
81 executions  were carried out in  the  second half of the war (November 17, 1922 
to  May 30 1923).  They took place in seventeen counties of men from 21 of the 32 
Irish counties.  Both in terms of the methods used to win it, and the IRA’s campaign 
of destruction   the conflict escalated as it became irregular. 
The     island’s  geography    had     traditionally   posed problems   for   
consolidating  central authority (Evans 1973: 25). Yet the   IRA  had made a 
fundamental   mistake by leaving the capital in the hands of their    enemies, 
allowing the Provisional Government to broadcast themselves to the outside  
world as  the  lawful  government in overall control of the situation (Blake 1986: 
36). With Dublin as  its epicentre, power was projected north, south, and west 
as  it had   been in all  previous efforts to subjugate the island. But this was   
not a half  conquest; the writ of  the state soon extended into every   region of 
the new state.  The Free State  would  intern more   than  double the number of 
people the British had done in the earlier conflict (1919-21). Patrick  Mangan 
was  a railway worker executed at the Curragh army base on  December 19 
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1922. His father went insane as a response and was committed to an asylum 
where he died two years later. His brother Thomas, who also worked on the 
railways, was interned for over a year, while his sister, a member of Cumann na 
mBan (the IRA’s sister organisation), lost her job in a local Christian Brothers 
School.1  
Civil   wars    need   not   become   protracted if  the  early  fighting is for the capital, 
and if  external  resources are placed at the state’s disposal early on (Herbst 2004: 
367). By September 1922 Britain had supplied 27,400 rifles, 6,606 revolvers, and 
246 Lewis guns  to  the  Provisional Government (Hopkinson 1988: 125). Moreover, 
the  public    became  alienated from the IRA when  its  guerrilla   tactics  subverted   
the economic  life of  the country by destroying roads, bridges, and railway lines.  An 
army report in March 1923 stated that   armed  opposition could only  be  found in a 
few places, and where IRA columns existed it was mainly due to   the  mountainous  
terrain.2 The  IRA declared a unilateral ceasefire on  April  30 1923. They buried their 
arms and returned home: there was no formal surrender. 
The Spread of the Executions. 
As   a deterrent  the executions prevented the further assassination of 
members of the  parliament. As   punishment they allowed the army  to punish  
local IRA men for their actions or those of their comrades. However, the 
executions also demonstrated (symbolically)  the commitment of the treatyite 
 
1 Patrick Mangan, Military Pension File, DP 2979, militaryarchives.ie 




elite on the standing of authority in Ireland, and broadcast its ‘frame of 
reference’ or ‘code of power’ (Parsons 1964: 35). For the  Provisional 
Government they  were ‘an extreme but morally justifiable response to an IRA 
campaign that sought to overthrow a lawfully constituted state’ (Foster 2015: 
156). Anti-treatyites countered     that  the   Free  State    bowed  to  force 
majeure. One republican poster –‘The British     Empire Unlimited’-  compared   
the   position   of two Irish ministers,   Kevin O’ Higgins and   Richard  Mulcahy,  
in  a downward     chain of authority,     to  the  roles    Generals Sir Hamar 
Greenwood and Nevil MacReady played  in the executions after   the 1916 
Rising.3  
The   executions  are  no  longer a completely  taboo subject: most  studies of 
the Irish revolution  discuss them. There   are two legal  histories (Cambell 
1994; Enright 2019)   and  one  PhD thesis (Breen Murphy 2010)  on   the 
policy. The civil war  saw  the  loss of  leaders on both sides,  such as   Michael 
Collins and Liam Lynch and historians of the executions also   stress the 
importance of   elite psychology. They  speak of   ‘bitterness’ (Valiulis 1992: 
184) ‘hatred’ (Coogan 2006: 141) ‘ruthlessness’ (Ferriter 2015: 281) ‘fratricidal 
violence’ (Townshend 2014: 451) ‘savagery’  (Neeson 1989: 277 ) and ‘terror’ 
(Coogan and Morrison 1998:  4). Some  ask whether  the restraint necessary 
for the existence of  civilised life had also loosened (Foster 2015: 281; Garvin 
1996: 93;Townshend 2014; 441).  
 Less attention has  been  paid to  geography. The executions   formed part of  
‘a war of reconquest’ (Keogh 1994: 15-17) and the state’s  territorial  imperative 
 
3 ‘The British Empire Unlimited’, P150/1657, De Valera Papers UCDA. 
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explains  more  about their diffusion than elite politics. Indeed mapping their 
spread in 1922-23  is  a way of tracing the expansion of state power. The first 
phase was from October to December 1922, when the executions were 
decided at the national level. The strategic hub of any state-building project was 
first Dublin and the Central Lowland lying north of a line from Galway Bay to 
Dublin and south of the drumlin belt, (north of which lay Northern Ireland). The 
first step in the consolidation of state authority was to control this historic 
‘eastern triangle’: the geographical nucleus ‘from which men have their best 
chance of commanding the whole country’ (Andrews 1967:21). The first 29 
executions of the civil war took place within this eastern triangle. Figure 2. 







The second phase began on  January 11, 1923 when the decision was taken to 
decentralise responsibility to committees of officers at the battalion level, resulting in 
more localised executions. Twenty-one men were executed in 1922, a further sixty in 
1923. Figure 3 shows their territorial reach. Between November 17, 1922 and  April 
26, 1923 35 executions took place in the eastern command area, 20 in the western 
command area, 19 in the southern command area, and seven in the Curragh.4 
Indeed the  new  state  executed  many   more IRA prisoners in a year than the 
British Army had done  between 1916 and 1921. The latter’s  were concentrated in 
Dublin, the Free State was more determined to dominate rural areas. When the IRA 
split over the Treaty, the First Western division was the only one along the western 
seaboard not to go anti-treaty: pro-treaty strength was concentrated on the east 
coast, the midlands, and the border counties.  Before  January 11  no executions 
had taken place in the western counties of Clare, Galway, Kerry Limerick and Mayo: 
subsequently there were twenty. 
 







One can also  identify a  third stage when local factors influenced their location 
within counties. When General Paddy O’  Daly became commanding officer  of 
the National Army in Kerry he decided to have four men from different areas of 
the county executed as a deterrent against further IRA activity. The men 
chosen to face the firing squad on  January 20, 1923 at Ballymullen Gaol 
Tralee were from Ballycarbery, Castleisland, Causeway and Knockeendubh 
(near Killarney) (Horgan 2015: 291). In county Tipperary the same month, four 
IRA men who had been sentenced to death were transferred from Templemore, 
where the people were reportedly angry, to the pro-treaty town of Roscrea. 
They were executed at Roscrea Castle on January 15. 
The  executions  on  December 8  had  broadcast state power territorially; Richard 
Barrett was from Munster, Liam Mellowes (T.D.) represented Connaught, Joe 
McKelvey was from Ulster and Rory O’ Connor was from Leinster. However, at the 
decisive meeting of  the  cabinet  and the army council on January 11 Minister for 
Home Affairs, Kevin O’Higgins, complained that the psychological effect of an 
execution in Dublin is very slight in Wexford, Galway or Waterford (O’ Halpin 
1989:32). By  the  end of  the  civil war    executions had taken place in the four 
corners of the state: counties Donegal, Kerry, Louth and Wexford. Republican 
historian Dorothy MacArdle (1937: 863-4)  first  noted the territorial logic.  January 
1923  saw executions take  place in every direction, North, South, East and West: 
three in Dundalk on the 13th, four in Roscrea and one in Carlow on the 15th, and 
eleven (2 in Limerick, 4 in Tralee, and five in Athlone) on the 20th. She  claimed that  
victims were chosen from the centre of each district where the IRA was operating 




Broadcasting  state  power over territory  has been a problem for many new states, 
especially those with huge territories, dispersed populations and culturally distinct 
groups (Herbst 2004: 36). In Ireland the   obstacles were the local power of the IRA 
and the public’s alleged lack of civic virtue in not supporting the authorities. The    
executions broadcast power  across  three types of boundary. The territorial         
boundary refers to  the  way they were  spread throughout the territory of  the state, 
making the presence of the state felt at the local level. In terms of social boundaries, 
those   killed were mainly young working class men, adding credence to the view 
that the republican cause was ‘back to the men of no property’.5  In terms of     
organisational boundaries, most protagonists had been members of the same 
organisations when the civil war started.  The executions constituted a point of ‘no-
return’ since they demonstrated that the government was willing to back its   own 
propaganda with ruthless measures against its former comrades.  
 
Given the bitterness of the Treaty split, it is not hard to explain why the executions  
were introduced: explaining their spatial diffusion is the purpose here.  I first trace  
the origins of the policy  to elite politics. Then I consider what guerrilla war conditions 
explain  about their diffusion. Finally, since commanders on the ground had such a 
say in 1923,  I ask how much  their changing relationship with Dublin  tells us. 
‘Fratricidal Flipping’,  Centralization and Elite Politics. 
 Staniland  (2012)   suggests   that ‘fratricidal flipping’   may    begin   when, during a 
peace  process, some leaders of an  insurgent organization  decide that    the      
 
5 The phrase, used by the executed Liam Mellowes,  was first coined in the eighteenth 
century by one of the founders of the United Irishmen, Wolfe Tone. 
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centralization of  authority   is necessary to   achieve their   goals. He relates 
‘fratricidal flipping’ to the process of ‘ethnic defection’  to a state.  By ‘ethnic 
defection’ he means that some insurgents  go over to the state’s side and  ‘flip’  by 
turning against former comrades. The decision to sign the Treaty  was not ethnic 
defection –the pro-Treatyites were nationalists who valued full Irish independence - 
but their acceptance of the Treaty raised similar accusations ‘of betrayal, of selling 
out, or becoming puppets in the hands of the state’. The choice of some IRA men to 
turn their guns on their former comrades, and their possession of intelligence later 
had a decisive impact militarily.  
Staniland   outlines three  scenarios: (1) ex ante political disagreements will drive 
defection by moderates, particularly during peace processes; (2) defection is the 
result of deliberate state policies of manipulation and repression; (3) insurgent forces 
use force against part of their own movement when it serves strategic goals, such as 
the consolidation of central authority and army discipline (Staniland 2012: 19-21). 
Both ex ante political differences, and British policies of divide and rule explain the 
transition from Treaty to civil war in 1922. Yet  the pro-treatyite desire to consolidate 
power   explains the origins of the execution policy. It     gained momentum    in the  
context of  the   re-organisation   of      institutions   and  the     process  of    
legitimation, both  part of  the   process   of     centralising   power (Janos 1964: 130-
40). 
The  executions  became  the   instrument  of a small group of men, insecure in  their  
power, and  sceptical of  the  civic  virtues of  the   population they ruled over.		They 
departed from  the firm but conciliatory    policies of Michael    Collins, Commander in 
Chief of the National Army. He      remained against executions   up to      his    death 
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in an ambush   on  August 22, 1922.  Collins had     occupied a   dual role:   head of 
a   democratically   elected   government,  and  President of the     Irish   Republican    
Brotherhood, formed in  1858.    During    the  summer    of 1922 he    had  seemed       
bent on  entrusting key   posts within the    Free State  to  other  republican   brothers 
(Regan 2007:  339-40). The   most      dramatic sign   that this revolutionary fraternity 
would not last was the  execution  of    four  leaders of the  Brotherhood  on   
December 8,1922. 
 
The new civilian  leaders clearly had   less  tolerance for   the  shady   
interconnections between    governmental    and    non-governmental  organisations.  
On   September 27, 1922  the    Provisional  Government   passed a Special Powers   
Resolution  that  allowed the  military to   detain   persons taken in  arms who had  
been   caught participating in arson, looting, or  attacks on private property,  or  
attacking Free  State  military   forces. They      were  to     be   tried  secretly  by  
military   tribunals  with   the authority  to  pass  death   sentences. The  accused   
had  a right to       representation     by legal   staff within  the  army.  The first   batch   
took   place   in   Dublin    on  November  17   when  James Fisher, Peter Cassidy, 
Richard Twohig, and  John Gaffney were  executed in   Kilmainham     Jail.  The men   
were  very young;   Fisher  only  eighteen.   
 
The   official     statement on the executions, which took place on December 8,    said  
that  the four leaders had    been   killed     as ‘a reprisal’ for     the    assassination of  
Seán Hales   the  previous day, and   as a ‘solemn warning’   against others. In late 
September 1922 the IRA Chief of Staff, Liam Lynch, had decided that those who 
voted for the executions, and ‘aggressive Free State supporters’ were ‘legitimate 
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targets’.  After  Hales’s       assassination,   senior      army   officers  had      
requested        permission to  take out   and  execute  four   leaders from       the 
Four  Courts    garrison: the      government  authorised   them to  do  so  the    next    
morning,      fearing   that    their   own   supporters     would cave in   as  the  IRA 
began  to  act on Lynch’s   orders.6 The killing of Hales  had forced the  Provisional 
Government’s hand. William      Cosgrave, now    President of    the Executive    
Council,  claimed  that  his  government  had been  willing  to   extend  leniency to  
all   remaining prisoners  subject to   military trials, but  Hales’s  assassination  
changed things (Knirck 2014: 76).  
 
The   Provisional   Government  then    adopted  an  official  hostage policy, under   
which prisoners       would  be     sentenced to death,  but      received a  stay of  
execution    pending   the        improvement of   order in    the areas where  they  had  
been    active (Breen Murphy 2010: 3). This    policy    was   adopted in  Kerry on 
December 13 1922,  and  later  extended to some  other counties. In     Kerry 
General    Murphy put up  a  notice      confirming that four  of   those sentenced to 
death in the   county had had their sentences   commuted. Reports from   the  local      
Commanding Officer had commented on   the  favourable    condition of  the    
county, leading Richard Mulcahy, Army  Chief of Staff, to order   that the men be 
used as hostages. However if, after Thursday December 21, there     were   
ambushes of troops, or interference with railways or private property ‘the sentences 
will be carried out forthwith’ (Irish Times, December 1 1922).   
 
 
6 Blythe, ‘Witness Statement’. 
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The     final  step in the escalation of the policy  was  the    decision on  January 11  
to   devolve  responsibility   to   local commanders, which   resulted  in  executions  in       
counties  Louth, Tipperary, Carlow, Kerry, Tipperary, Westmeath,  Waterford, Offaly, 
Laois,  Wexford,   Donegal, Galway, and Clare  in 1923. At   the   decisive     meeting   
of     the    cabinet and  the  army council     Patrick   Hogan, the Minister for 
Agriculture  warned of  a   land war (Regan 1999: 120). Those         wanting      more      
severe  methods  got  their    way: committees   of  officers  were    established at     
battalion  level  throughout    the country to    pass   sentences on  IRA   prisoners. 
The    policy gained  a fresh momentum: from early December  cases    were almost 
exclusively dispatched by such committees (Breen Murphy 2010: 190). Units of army 
officers, many not ranked higher than captain, were formed as mobile military 
tribunals, travelling around rural Ireland to conduct the trials of prisoners that had 
been apprehended under the September resolution (Walsh 2015: 387). Even  
sympathisers caught carrying republican propaganda could now find themselves 
facing a firing squad.     
 
Staniland (2012: 21) suggests that fratricidal conflict can occur either in a top-down 
fashion, when an insurgent faction decides that victory can best be achieved by the 
consolidation  of power under its aegis, or from below  when local feuds escalate into 
a more general   military conflict. The Irish   independence movement  disintegrated  
from the top-down;   the cabinet, then the Dáil, and then the IRA split over the 
Treaty. Yet  local military  power was crucial. After  the July 1921 truce with the 
Crown forces  local IRA brigades had continued to recruit, to prepare for further 
warfare, and to take over bases from the departing British troops. When   each  
brigade voted on the Treaty three quarters went anti-treaty, controlling two thirds of 
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the new state’s territory (Hopkinson 1988: Map One). On  July 1, 1922 the     First  
Southern Division, (twelve   brigades  covering Cork, Kerry,  Waterford and        the 
western part of Limerick) had  27,277 men on its roles. The      Second   Southern  
(five brigades covering Limerick, Tipperary  and  Kilkenny) had  8,955 men. Most  of  
these    35,000 plus men were   free to take part in the guerrilla war in August.7  
 
Since   the  executions     constituted ‘a point of no return’ within the nationalist 
movement each step in the implementation of the policy  constituted an escalation of 
the conflict. Most historians back the pro-treatyites:  ‘at some point or other the 
government had to meet force with greater force and IRA  terror with state terror’ (O’ 
Halpin 1999: 37). The executions  worked as   a      deterrent: after      Hales’s death  
no  other  member of  the  parliament   would be    killed. They also killed off the 
possibilities for reconciliation by an elite committed to the norm of civilian supremacy 
(Regan 1999: 125). Yet   elite politics do not explain why  the policy gained 
momentum  when it spread territorially  or   the absence of  elite purges.  By 
September 1923  exactly  half of the anti-treaty candidates who were elected to the 
Dáil in June 1922 were in custody (Irish Times 29 September 1923). They  survived 
the civil war. There were no further executions of republican elites after the 
executions in Mountjoy jail on December 8.  
Guerrilla War. 
 
7 These, and  subsequent figures for the strength of IRA units on July 1st 1922  are taken from 
the IRA rolls in   The Military Pension Archive, Military Archives, ie. The lists were mainly  
calculated  in 1935. 
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The execution policy was conceived of, implemented and extended in the context of 
a guerrilla war. It mattered that Ministers considered this war  ‘a movement of 
anarchy’, ‘a criminal conspiracy against the state’, and ‘a criminal’ rather than a civil 
war (Knirck 2014: 34-55). Cahir Davitt, First Advocate General, argued that prior to 
the lapse of the amnesty offer on  October 15, 1922, the IRA had tacitly been 
accorded belligerent rights. After that date they lost those rights, especially as they 
wore no uniform, carried no military emblems and did not openly carry their arms.8 
The transgression model of civil war violence  suggests that those who do not 
recognize the legal claims of the sovereign place themselves beyond the protection 
of the laws of regular warfare, and can be treated as criminals (Kalyvas 2006: 62-
63). Legal recognition was  important:  the pre-truce IRA had also  been considered 
illegal by the British authorities. The Catholic  bishops’ joint pastoral published  on 
October  11,1922 declared it a matter of ‘divine law’ that the ‘legitimate authority in 
Ireland just now’ was the Provisional Government, that ‘the guerrilla warfare now 
being carried on by the Irregulars was without moral sanction; and therefore that the 
killing of National Soldiers was murder before God’ (Murray 2000: 87). In 1922 the 
Provisional Government insisted that the press call the anti-treaty IRA ‘irregulars’. 
Besides bearing unauthorised arms, the offences during which people were arrested 
for trial: aiding the ‘irregulars’, disrupting railway lines, alleged robbery of a mail van, 
attempted burglary, theft and armed robbery were also  ‘irregular.’  
Balcells (2019) poses the question of  whether violence  is a product of  pre-war  
political  differences or of   wartime conditions.  In   1923  executions    were     
 
8 Cahir Davitt, ‘Witness Statement by Hon. Justice Cahir Davitt’ Bureau of Military History 
1913-1921.  W.S.. 1,1751, 1955, 81-82. 
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administered     not as a response to national politics but   in  order to shape local 
political and military realities. While  those    carried  out in 1922  had taken place in 
or near Dublin,  in 1923 they mainly took place outside of Leinster (Foster 2015: 155-
6). January 1923, when a total of 34 prisoners were executed was critical. The  
increase  was a response to a campaign of wholesale destruction in December  after 
which some took matters into their own hands (Keogh 1994: 15-16). Finally, after a 
lull in February 1923, their resumption in March was calculated to  achieve ‘a 
satisfactory geographical spread in the interests of deterrence’ (Enright 2019:97).  
The  local  power of  the  IRA   now mattered. In  Wexford because of a lack of 
support from Waterford Command, inefficiency, and an uncooperative population, 
IRA activity had increased well into the new year.9 The South Wexford Brigade had 
1,367 men on the rolls in July 1922, four hundred more than it had had a year earlier. 
The columns of Thomas O’ Sullivan in the New Ross area, and of Bob Lambert 
around Wexford town, controlled large areas of the countryside in the spring of 1923. 
One of the most active units was the Kyle flying column in Central Wexford: the three 
men executed in Wexford town on March 13 were from this unit.  Kalyvas (2006: 
333-36) suggests that the denser the social contacts at the local level the more the 
audience for such acts of violence . On April 10, 1923 six men were taken aside in 
Galway jail and told they would be executed in Tuam the next morning. They were all 
part of the second western division under Tom Maguire. Tuam was nearer Headford, 
where most of the men were from, and their execution was a reprisal for the attack 
on the army barracks there on  April 8 (Newall 2015: 28-9). 
 
9 ‘South Wexford Brigade General Report’, January 17, 1923 (UCD Archives, Moss 
Twomey Papers, P69/13/4-1). 
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Kalyvas (2006: 196) argues that in the early stages of civil war - when situations of 
contested sovereignty exist - indiscriminate violence, including the targeting of 
civilians is more likely. Selective state violence is more effective after a government 
has achieved territorial control. More discriminate forms of violence become possible 
when the population co-operates in terms of providing information, and because 
proper policing is established in local areas. In Ireland executions had not been 
needed to establish control; they were a means of consolidating it at the local level. 
Most took place in rural areas where state control was predominant,  not absolute. 
Due to many of its men being part of the same units before 1921, the army was well-
informed about its enemies, their hiding places and tactics. It could more easily 
distinguish them from the general population than the Crown forces had been able to 
do. 
The executions were a selective form of state violence.  The Army Emergency 
Powers Resolution was to apply only to those found in arms. Of the 81  the number 
of those sentenced to death for the possession of either ammunition, arms or 
explosives is 63. Thirteen of these faced another charge, while seven sentences 
were for taking part in attacks in which soldiers died, for conspiracy to murder or for 
murder. For bank robberies only 2 were executed (Cambell 1994: 360-372). Those 
guilty of other offences were generally not put before military courts, despite the 
Minister for Agriculture, Patrick Hogan, wanting ‘immediate and drastic action against 
people who seized other peoples’ land.’10 Secondly, while the army held many IRA 
prisoners as hostages, most were spared. Seán Prendergast, an IRA prisoner in 
Gormonstown internment camp, recalled that the response of the prisoners to the 
 
10 “Special Infantry Corps”, Military Archives, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin. 
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executions on December 8 was that the state wanted to spread fear and terror. 
Anyone could be next.11 Yet the executions had ceased by June 1923, when more 
than 12,000 republicans were in jail or internment camps. Most cases brought before 
the courts (or the ancillary committee system) did not result in executions (Yeates 
2015: 258). Moreover, geographic variation was pronounced. A total of 40 men were 
killed while in army custody in county Kerry (Ryle Dwyer 1996: 364). Yet only one 
execution took place in neighbouring Cork, the most violent county during the earlier 
War of Independence. Lastly, 645 women were interned for ‘actively assisting’ the 
IRA (Matthews 2012: Appendix One). Their execution was not considered. During 
the entire war no woman was charged with a capital offence. 
Four  civilians were executed.  Balcells (2010), Gutiérez-Sanin and Wood (2017) and  
Steele (2017) consider how   political divisions  influence  violence against civilians 
during wartime. High levels of  prior  mobilisation,  strong  collective identities  and 
the existence of  compact populations with clear loyalties can  make civilian support 
a critical resource. In Ireland  civilians were generally not  targeted. Men  were  
selected for execution  not by virtue of  their  membership of    particular groups but 
after allegations of individual behaviour.  In such a non-ethnic (perhaps  non-
ideological) civil  war,  while local political opinions were hard to observe  the army  
knew who remained active in the IRA (Steele 2017: 53). Lines of division were also 
formed late. Tom Maguire  reflected that initially ‘you might be in touch with 
personalities on your side today, and tomorrow you could be told that they had gone 
over to the Free State side’ (O’Gadhra 1999: 139). A number who ‘flipped’ sides 
 
11 Seán Prendergast, ‘Witness Statement of Seán Prendergast, Captain IRA Dublin 1921’, 
Bureau of Military History 1913-1921. W.S. 755, 1952. 
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ended up being executed. The five executed for treachery at Portobello Barracks on 
8 January were Free State soldiers who chose to aid the IRA. Seven former British 
soldiers were executed after taking the anti-treaty side. 
Those executed   were usually young  IRA volunteers. The ranks of the IRA had 
swelled after the truce with Britain. Foster (2015: 35)  stresses    that    prior to  1914 
the    young had  occupied  the   bottom rung of  the social   ladder; they were  
politically non-entities. The Sinn Féin independence movement which swept the polls 
in 1918 then   idealised  Irish youth in   contrast to    the  corruption    of  the older 
‘Home Rule’ parliamentary tradition. The   civil war   saw  a    return to  the  pre-war  
status quo. The   worst       example  was   when  the     bodies of three     young 
men, aged 16 to 17, were  found  in    Dublin having   been picked up by detectives  
the    previous day  for  distributing  republican   leaflets. Most of  those executed 
were  under twenty five; a significant    minority  were also  teenagers. A  contrast  
with 1916   suggests itself.   The    fifteen   leaders   that  were  executed after the 
Easter Rising  were   mainly       well-known   figures in    the   cultural life of the city;  
both  class  and  race  might have   suggested  they    be    spared  the   final  
punishment for  treason. When  they  were   executed they   were   instantly   turned 
into    national  martyrs. While  those  executed in 1922-23   also   saw   themselves 
as   stepping  into this revolutionary tradition of  sacrifice, there   was no   
comparable public reaction to their deaths. 
 T.D.s’ lives  were usually spared. Tom Maguire, a  member of the second Dáil, 
survived after he had  been  captured by the National Army  and  sentenced  to   
death. Yet all five of the men executed in Tuam, county Galway, on April 11, 
(including his teenage brother), were part of his 2nd Western  Brigade. Four of the 
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five men executed in Athlone on  January 20 were also members of the western 
division.  Maguire speculated that the authorities found it easier to ‘make an example 
of younger brothers’ (O’Gadhra 1999: 141), and government propaganda blamed 
youthful irresponsibility for prolonging the IRA campaign (Foster 2015: 32). Were  
such youthful targets  an alternative to  elite purges?  The state was willing to 
execute leaders. When Senator Bagwell, Chair of the Great Northern Railway, was 
abducted (and his house burnt down), Commandant General Dan Hogan - with a 
certain amount of publicity - gathered forty of the most prominent IRA prisoners into 
Mountjoy jail, suggesting that were Bagwell killed, the number of executions would 
be far greater than on 8 December. Bagwell was allowed to escape.12 The  IRA’s  
own lack of   ruthlessness in not implementing Lynch’s orders against 
parliamentarians best explains the rarity of elite executions. Minister Ernest Blythe 
recalled the case  of T.D. Frank Bulfin, who had attempted to resign from the Dáil  
because  he  was subject to intimidation by republicans. Bulfin was persuaded to 
remain, but the incident made Blythe feel that if there had been a big scare following 
one or two deaths of a T.D. or Senator, ‘it would be our duty to apply sufficient terror 
to counteract it.’13	
Regan (2013)  argues that  its  association  with  Bolshevism   accounts ‘for the 
ferocity  with which the    rebellion was put down’.  Most      executions were of   
ordinary     young  men  from   working  class   backgrounds. Of  the   five  leaders 
executed,  Erskine Childers was a well-known     novelist, Rory O’ Connor was a 
 
12 Ernest Blythe,  ‘Witness Statement by Ernest Blythe’, Bureau of Military History 1913-
1921. W.S. 939, 1954. 
13 ‘Witness Statement by Ernest Blythe’, 174. 
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trained  engineer, and   Joseph McKelvy   had   some  accountancy     training.       
Of  the    76  victims who   were not   leaders,  only   one, John Larkin (son of a     
Magistrate in Derry), was  from a  middle class family. The  remaining 75 were    
from  ordinary, mainly rural   backgrounds.   Although   not all  had    work  
experience, a common     occupation   was  labouring: quite a few were farmers 
sons.  Condemning the first executions  (of four young Dubliners) on November 17, 
the Labour Leader, Thomas Johnson,     argued that  their  disadvantages of youth, 
social standing and education ought to have been taken into account in the 
sentencing.14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Yet guerrilla  war  conditions  explain more  than class. Fear of social disorder had 
influenced the  January 11 meeting. Patrick Hogan thought the land situation so 
ungovernable that it was up to the army to take actions against people who seized 
land (Regan 1999: 120). In February the Minster of Defence established the Special 
Infantry Corps specifically to tackle agrarian disorder. Yet no one was executed for 
agrarian offences or labour agitation in 1923; or for any of the offences the Corps 
was established to deal with. The Corp’s role was to provide aid to the Civil Power: 
executions did not fall within its powers. Contrast this approach with the policy on the 
railways where the state’s military interests  were at stake. The IRA attacks involved 
burning carriages and destroying goods in transit, and were on a larger scale than 
during the war of independence. Four railway workers were executed in Kildare on 
19 December, while two more men were executed in Limerick jail on January 20 for 
their part in the destruction of the railways in the Tuam area. 
 





The authorities   tried to  depersonalise the executions. The criteria for selecting men  
remained secret. The notice relatives received was usually in the form of ‘remains of 
------ coffined and buried’ with the name of the dead man inserted in the blank. 
Remains were interred at the place of execution. The move away from public 
executions the previous century had largely been driven by a fear of crowds, and the 
potential to call the legitimacy of the state into question. For similar reasons, the 
executions were carried out behind closed doors.  This  strategy nonetheless failed. 
The shooting of four Kerry-born IRA men in Drumboe Castle county Donegal on 
March  14,1923 after the killing of a Free State soldier is an example. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a team of former British soldiers were brought in to carry out 
the execution. Yet when the firing squad failed to kill one of the men, Charlie Daly, 
the officer who oversaw the court-martial and the execution stepped forward to 
deliver the coup de grace with a revolver. This officer was none other than Joe 
Sweeney, who had been a close student friend of Daly (Griffith and O’ Grady 1998: 
306). ‘Selective violence’ should not imply  that there was ‘nothing personal’ about 
the executions.   
Nonetheless, seeing  the spread of the  executions as a response to     guerrilla war  
conditions explains  more  about  their  diffusion  than    elite  politics or  class 
conflict. Moreover, the policy remained  selective.  The military courts and 
committees had tried almost 1,200 men, and  of these over 400 were sentenced  to  
death  (Enright 2019:  6). The    majority of  this  400   survived. ‘Diffusion’ can imply 
a process of contagion:  ‘in  which individuals  function outside normative constraint 
and their actions are propelled by high levels of emotional and psychological strain’ 
(Soule 2004: 244).  This approach to the executions    is  common among historians.  
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An execution   policy ‘born in bloodshed and hatred’  (Coogan 2006: 138) created a 
spiral of bitterness and revenge such  that the civil war acquired the character of   ‘a 
vendetta on a national scale’ (Hopkinson 1988: 190). Selective violence suggests   a 
more  ‘organised, rational and goal oriented’ model of diffusion (Soule op. cit). 
 
This diffusion  was  shaped  by  the  two  related dimensions of state power: 
centralisation  and  the  localisation of   violence (Mann 1986: 521). A    rapid  re-
organisation of  administrative power  had taken  place at the centre, especially  as 
the     influence of  the civilian  leaders grew. At the same time, recognising  the 
psychological         distance between Dublin and rural Ireland,  these  leaders      
devolved the power of execution to army officers at the local command  level, feeling  
that the authority of the state was insufficiently felt there. Garvin (1966: 103)   shows 
that the  Irish army wanted to break the hold  the local IRA had  on  shaping people’s 
perceptions of the centre.  The  next section discusses the relationship  between    
this devolution of initiative  and the spread of  the executions. As centralisation and 
the localisation of violence came  in tension the result was a  lack of control. 
 
Principal Agent Problems. 
Once the  decision to devolve responsibility was taken in January, the government 
(‘the principal’) had ceded the initiative to the commanders on the ground (‘the 
agents’). The execution  policy  produced  ‘a principal-agent problem’ which   
became  acute in 1923.  Such ‘problems’ revolve on how a principal controls a self-
interested agent in possession of superior information (Mitchell 2004:5). The army’s 
legal staff played no role in selecting those to be executed. The approach predicts 
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problems down the chain of command when commanding officers and their 
subordinates come to have different preferences as to application of military force.  
   
IRA Commander Tom Maguire reflected, 
It is said that the Free State ‘provincialized’ its killings, both official and unofficial, by having 
the majority of them carried out away from Dublin, in contrast to the British who had all of 
theirs, except one in Dublin and Cork. It is my opinion that their objective was to involve all 
their senior officers in this policy, so that there would be no denying it afterwards. Joe 
Sweeny carried out executions in Drumboe in Donegal. Dan Hogan had them in Dundalk. 
Michael McCormick had them in Portlaoise, Birr and Roscrea, Joseph Cummins had them in 
Wexford, Liam Stack had one in Carlow, Seán MacEoin had them in Athlone and Michael 
Brennan had them in Tuam, Limerick and Ennis (O’ Gadhra 1999: 139-142) 
While all executions still had to be approved by the Army Council,  local actors 
increasingly gained the initiative. In Kerry on January 11, 1923, an army poster 
appeared in Tralee saying that four men had been found guilty of the possession of 
firearms and sentenced to death. It also warned that the IRA activity in the county 
had to stop, or the stay on their execution would be removed. In response, the local 
IRA commander made it known that were the men killed, eight named supporters of 
the Free State would be shot. The men were never executed. However, on  January 
20, 1923 four different local men were executed. The night before, Richard Mulcahy - 
now Commander in Chief - had authorised the execution by signing the back of a 
brown envelope. This was a response to a request for a deterrent because of the 
renewed IRA activity in the county; the local commander had simply telegraphed 
Mulcahy for his approval (Breen Murphy 2010: 3). 
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The  executions  which  took  place  in  Tuam, Tralee and Ennis in April 1923 were 
also a response to  events determined  by the local authorities  (Enright, 2019: 106-
111)  An IRA column led by Michael Pierse in north Kerry had agreed to lay down 
arms in return for captured men from his column not being executed. When the 
authorities did execute one of those men, James Hanlon, two of the released men, 
Reginald Hathaway and Edward Greaney, decided to join a column led by Timothy 
(Aero) Lyons. This column had several men who had rejected Pierse’s peace move. 
When seven of them were found hiding in the Clashmealcon Caves near Causeway, 
after one private had been killed in the shooting that ensued, Lyons negotiated a 
surrender for himself. When he was climbing to safety on April 16 the army either 
severed the rope or it snapped, and he fell to his death. Two other men had drowned 
while swimming to freedom. The three surviving men (including Hathaway and 
Greaney) were executed on April 25. 
With the principal agent approach we shift from the language of control to that of 
revenge. In Kerry, outside the towns, the centre, south, and east of the county 
remained dominated by IRA units well into 1923, especially in mountainous areas. 
On  March 6 1923 three officers and two privates in the National Army were killed by 
a booby trap in the village of Knocknagoshel. The two privates, Laurence O’ Connor 
(Causeway) and Michael Galvin (Killarney), as well as Lieutenant Patrick O’ Connor 
(Castleisland), were from the county (The Kerryman 16 August 2017). The following 
day the local commanding officer authorised the use of prisoners to clear mines. This 
may have been interpreted as a sign that the authorities wanted revenge: over the 
following four weeks 23 prisoners would be killed, and five more legally executed.  
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The IRA had become divided into  ‘the hunters and the hunted’. MacArdle (1992: 6) 
comments that the National Army was ‘fighting for a cause they hated against the 
cause they loved, hunting and killing their own comrades and leaders’. She recounts 
the story of Bertie Murphy from Kerry who was seventeen when killed by the Free 
State soldiers in September 1922. He had become captain of his local Na Fíanna 
(the IRA’s youth wing) after one of its officers joined the National Army. This officer 
(named Healy) then searched for him for four months, and was part of the army 
guard at a local hotel after Murphy had been arrested. The soldiers first used Murphy 
as a hostage to remove IRA barricades, and eventually shot him in captivity after a 
group of Free State troops had been ambushed (ibid: 99-100). 
One could not distinguish the official executions from other forms of state violence. 
Kerry Republicans claimed that prisoners were murdered on the roads or in bed, 
fired on indiscriminately while in prison compounds, or died as a consequence of the 
mistreatment of the wounded in prison.15 Principal-agent problems generally 
emerge when units of the army exploit the distance between them and the central 
command to carry out acts of violence for private or opportunistic ends. An example 
was the unlawful killing of men after their capture or surrender. O’ Halpin (1999: 35) 
suggests that as many as 150 IRA men were killed in this way: Enright (2019:6) 
gives a figure of  125. This was not ‘policy’, but was tolerated as a ‘practice’ (Wood 
2014: 470-1). One example was Brian MacNeill, son of the Minister of Education, 
Eoin MacNeill, who appears to have been killed in September 1922 by Free State 
soldiers after surrendering in arms in Donegal. The Minister chose to believe that this 
 
15 “Annex- propaganda statement” P150/1657, De Valera Papers, UCDA. 
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account of the death of his son, an IRA Officer in a remote county, was republican 
propaganda. 
When the initiative passed to officers on the ground, the army had knowledge of the 
prior activities of those it sentenced. In January  O’ Daly wired Mulcahy for his 
approval to execute ‘three exceptionally bad cases.’ After a lull in February, Mulcahy 
himself decided that ‘bad cases’ should be prepared for execution when the process 
resumed (Breen Murphy 2010: 193, 214). At the same time  those further down the 
ranks could also spare   lives. Arrested in Dublin after an attack on Free State 
troops, with four men who were executed on  November 30, one young man had his 
death sentence commuted to penal servitude by the authorities, because he was the 
son of Michael Mallin who had been executed in 1916.16 Typically, when the army 
apprehended a group of IRA men, only some were executed. Mick Kennedy had 
been arrested and convicted of the possession of arms and ammunition with Patrick 
McNamara, who was executed in Roscrea on  January 15 1923. A Free State soldier 
had intervened and arranged a pardon for Kennedy (O’ Dwyer 2006: 186). On  
January 26 the army executed three young men in county Offaly after a series of 
robberies. A fourth teenager from the same area was pardoned because of his 
youth, the alleged intervention of the Catholic Church, and also the possible status of 
his family who were substantial farmers (McConway 2007). 
 The principal agent approach assumes an inverse relationship between the degree 
of accountability within an army and the territorial distance between the principal and 
its agents. The appointment of Dubliner O’ Daly, (formerly a member of Collins’ 
intelligence ‘squad’) as commanding officer for Kerry in the south-west resulted in a 
 
16 Davitt, Witness Statement, 43 and 55. 
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series of brutal extra-judicial killings by officers within his inner circle, including the 
massacre of nine IRA prisoners by tying them to a mine at Ballyseedy on  March 7, 
1923. When a court of inquiry was established by the army to investigate Ballyseedy, 
the court President, with two other senior officers of the National army, was O’ Daly 
himself. The result was a whitewash; O’ Daly retained his command (Price 2018). 
If state violence had an ideal form; it would be top-down, authorised for strategic 
purposes by an elected government, and carried out within a legal framework by 
state agents.17 The principal-agent approach questions whether these criteria can 
survive the decentralisation of initiative in civil war.  At the 2016 commemorative 
event for Michael Collins, current President M.D. Higgins called for both sides’ 
atrocities to be recognised as cruel, vicious uncontrolled, and at times, informed by 
vengeance rather than any compassion’ (Irish Times 21 August 2016). Elements on 
both sides were ‘out of control’. Since the origins of the policy can be traced to 
Collins’s assassination the executions formed part of a chain of reprisals. Dan Breen 
of the 3rd Tipperary IRA Brigade recalled the situation in Tipperary: 
A policy of reprisal and counter-reprisal now held sway and continued in ever-growing 
intensity until the end of the war. Executions on one side were followed in many cases by 
executions on the other side, while mansions and houses of prominent supporters of the 
Irish Free State were given to the flames.18 
 
17 Elizabeth Jean Wood, Presentation, Workshop on State Violence, London School of 
Economics, June 2016. 
18 Dan Breen, ‘Witness Statement by Dan Breen T.D.’ Bureau of Military History 1913-
1921. W.S.1,763, 1959, 137. 
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Of  the  Senators (many  Protestant), more than 50% (21) lost their country homes. 
In the year after the Treaty was signed, (up to December 5, 1922), a total of 89 
mansions or large country houses were burned down; in the fifteen weeks following 
December 6, 1922 a total of 103 were destroyed (Clarke 2014: 7). This  sectarian 
turn indicated what could have happened had the war continued (Foster 2015: 281).   
The  principal-agent model focuses on how violence  changes in character as actors 
respond to the decentralisation of authority during civil war. The diffusion of the 
executions was a top-down process in the sense that local actors  ‘emulated’ the 
actions of those in higher positions of authority. The executions on December 8 had 
signalled to those further down the ranks that the lives of those in captivity were 
forfeit. They were a clear declaration of intent (Regan, 1999: 112). And    when thirty 
four men were executed for the illegal possession  of arms in January, hundreds   
knew that this charge was equally applicable to them (MacArdle 1937: 863). At the 
same time the agents also took advantage of the lack of accountability to the centre.   
The principal-agent model  suggests that state violence became more extensive in 
1923 because of the greater number of actors that could initiate executions, the 
greater variety of local factors that could justify such acts, and the loosening of 
central control  when the policy became decentralised. It also became harder to 
differentiate  official executions from other acts of state violence, suggesting that the 
policy was less ‘rational’  and ‘goal oriented’ than   ‘selective violence’ might imply. 
Ultimately, what brought them to an end was not the resolution  of the principal agent 




Historical debate has considered whether the ends justified the means: whether 
there was a price to pay for a properly ordered state. The outcome of the successful 
broadcast of state power would be the acceptance by the people of the right of the 
governing elite to govern in their name. This requires conformity with specific 
procedures. The participation of the anti-treatyites in the general election in August 
1923, and the entry of the anti-treaty Fianna Fáil into Dáil Éireann in July 1927 
followed the civil war. It is accordingly from a Clausewitzian perspective - of violence 
being an instrument of politics - that the 81 executions have been defended.19 
However, even when  violence may be intended to bring war to an end, it says 
something about the social and geographical basis of the state. When a state 
chooses war in pursuit of a particular goal, in the course of fighting that war it also 
discovers what it is (Dodds 2009: 30).  
 
An  elite  psychology  model informs most  work on the executions. Erskine  Childers 
was  a leader  executed on  November 24 1922 for possession of a revolver given to 
him by Michael Collins!20  Blythe  held him responsible for widening opposition to the 
Treaty, for poisoning the young minds of those ‘ignorant ordinary young fellows’ who 
would also be executed, and had they let Childers live, the pro-treaty position vis a 
vis the army and the public would be impossible. Ever since ancient Rome, a city 
 
19 Many  republican sources refer to only 77 executions of IRA men by the state. However, 
my  figures are drawn from three lists which  document 81 official executions: “Executions 
by Provisional or Saorstát Éireann Governments, 1922-24”; (TSCH S 1884 A, National 
Archives, Dublin); (P150/1657, Eamon de Valera Papers, UCD Archives, Dublin); (TCD 
7808/324: Childers Papers, Archives and Manuscripts TCD, Dublin).  
20  ‘Witness Statement by Ernest Blythe’, 186. 
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which in legend had emerged from an act of murder - of Remus by his twin brother 
Romulus –  fratricide has been associated with foundational violence (Armitage 
2017: 10).    Yet  the execution  policy changed as it was adapted to local realities.  
Most   were not of elites  or of officers (like Childers), and the avoidance of 
‘wholesale political murder’ by both sides is important  in assessing the  war’s legacy 
(Regan 1999: 120). The state’s strategy was not about eliminating enemies or former 
comrades per se, but about reminding people of how far the state could go in 
defence of the Treaty. 
 
Guerrilla war  conditions  explain  more  about  the spread of the executions   than  
elite politics. No one had been executed before the guerrilla phase: the executions 
stopped soon after  the IRA ceasefire.  From the   34 executions in  January 1923  
some also  concluded that the    location of a prisoners home was a factor in the 
courts’ decision as to whether a person was to be executed or not (MacArdle 1937: 
864). Yet this remains conjecture. Before the pro-treatyites left office in 1932, they  
destroyed by fire all the material on the workings of the military courts and tribunals 
and the reports on the executions. Hence we do not know why certain men were 
selected, whether people were executed for crimes they themselves committed  and 
whether the accusers personally knew the accused. Much of what was selective 
about the selective violence is unknowable. 
A reflection on the methods and sources used in this article must dwell on this point. 
Mapping the diffusion of the executions, and studying them in the context of the 
territorial expansion of the war, provides an ‘objective’ perspective on the policy 
which contrasts with the elite psychology approach. There is  enough in terms of 
official archives, subsequent interview material and local histories to support that 
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perspective. At the same time we cannot get inside the minds of the actors at the 
local level. Critics will  pose the question of whether actions were  not also dictated 
by the kind of personal and fraternal  ties that made  Childers’s execution so 
controversial. In his case there clearly was an intimate connection between  
perpetrators and  victim. But by destroying the records the authorities  have 
protected  themselves against similar accusations for other cases.   
The principal agent approach provides a good model of the dynamics of diffusion.  
Soule (2004: 301) considers the question of whether those that adapt a policy at the 
local level are active or passive agents. The executions are an example of 
‘reciprocation’; both the principal and the agent had a shared interest in  using them 
to broadcast state power at the local level. The approach also  raises  issues of 
accountability and control that are not central to the selective violence model. The 
autonomy of the agents could mean restraint; often it  exasperated the situation of 
legal uncertainty that made captured mens’ lives forfeit. Enright (2019: 123) insists 
on the connection between the unlawful spontaneous  killing of prisoners in custody 
and the  official executions. The former happened  consistently throughout the  war, 
especially in Dublin and Kerry, and reflected the administrative and legal vacuum   
the new state was operating in.  Cosgrave was   rhetorical when he  stated that he 
was prepared to ‘exterminate’ ten thousand republicans ‘if the country is going to 
live’ (Regan 1999: 122). Absent his side’s  outright military victory,   both forms of 
killing would have continued in tandem. 
This  ‘reciprocation’ (between  governing elites and  Commanders on the ground)  
raises the question of whether the executions  presented  a genuine principal-agent 
‘problem’ for the government. There was an  ‘ever-present division’ between the 
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civilian and military leaderships on this issue (Breen Murphy 2010:225). The 
executions     revealed   the  workings of      the  parliamentary  state  in Ireland: 
ministers took  collective  responsibility  for   the      policy and  prided themselves on 
their civic  and legal responsibilities. After Hales’s assassination, the cabinet     made    
the   decision to execute the four leaders    because  to    devolve this   power of     
decision to  the   army   would have been  seen  as an    evasion  of ministerial   
responsibility. The  army   ‘presumably’ chose   the four men  whose    execution 
would  have the    greatest effect   on ‘the Irregulars’.21 Yet Mulcahy’s chief   
concern remained  the reputation of the army, and by later refusing to acknowledge 
any  wrong-doing on its part in  Kerry   he could be accused of a cover-up (Breen 
Murphy 2010: 224). The tension  between Mulcahy and civilian leaders like Kevin O’ 
Higgins  over  the question of army indiscipline  persisted into 1924.  
The  Conflict that formed the State and Brother against Brother  are both appropriate 
book titles for the conflict  (Deasy 1994; Clifford 1993). The combination raises the 
question  of  why  state formation so often involves personal violence: why the 
impersonal  quality of state power produces intimate violence. The new state was 
born into  a  situation  where military power had become very diffuse and  where the  
ties uniting the movement were  tight at every level. After the  executions it was 
natural  to conclude that some leaders had gone out of their minds or that the  
foundations of civilization were weak in Ireland. Yet their diffusion had more to do 
with the geography of state power and the fact that   local military power stood  in the  
way of the new state’s territorial imperative. Diffusion in this context  was neither  





imposing  its will on the countryside,   at the price of being dragged into a series of 
local sometimes disconnected conflicts.    
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